The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe

…individuals can be placed in managerial positions for which they are not competent. Thus, Peter (1969) and Peter and Hull (2011) refer to the Peter Principle, which asserts that within a firm's hierarchy, every employee tends to rise to his or her level of incompetence, which may be an outcome of this process… 

A restatement of this principle asserts that company employees are ultimately promoted out of jobs for which they are capable of doing more or less what is expected of them, a hierarchical position referred to in Peter and Hull (2011) as the “level of competence,” and into positions which are situated in the company hierarchy at what is referred to in Peter and Hull (2011) as the “level of incompetence,” where they are incapable of doing what is expected of them. 

Another possible outcome of the promotion system… occurs when a company’s “most ineffective” workers are promoted to management, an outcome that Adams (1996) refers to as the Dilbert Principle. Put differently, the Dilbert Principle asserts that a company’s least effective employees are ultimately promoted directly to (middle) management without ever passing through what Peter and Hull (2011) describe as the temporary competence stages of the company hierarchy…

...university administrators sometimes engage in a variety of other productivity-stifling behaviors. For example, Faria et al. (2012) provide an economic analysis of “downward mobbing” in academe, describing a university administration’s bullying of productive faculty. This type of productivity-stifling activity may be motivated by professional jealousy, budget concerns, or retaliation for whistle-blowing activity on the part of the faculty, among others… 

These types of systems and their consequences explain why, as Cardoso et al. (2016) point out, academics tend to blame a lack of quality in higher education on the design and functioning of institutional governance and management systems… 

 …more than one-third of all appointments to the highest administrative position in U.S. business colleges and schools—that of dean—come from internal promotions. Given that the professoriate is made up mainly of risk-averse actors, using internal promotion as an incentive system may promote more faculty than is efficient, an example of the Peter Principle. Such a result may also be consistent with productivity-stifling governance systems in academe that lead to misaligned incentive structures and workplace mobbing. Additionally, we find evidence that the tenure of a typical “outside” dean exceeds that of a typical “inside” dean, suggesting that the Dilbert Principle is also an essential feature of management in higher education…

Faria, J. R., & Mixon Jr, F. G. (2020). The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe. Economics of Governance, 21(2), 115-132.