The LL game: The curious preference for low quality and its norms

"We investigate a phenomenon that we have experienced as common when dealing with an assortment of Italian public and private institutions: people promise to exchange high-quality goods and services (H), but then something goes wrong and the quality delivered is lower than promised (L). While this is perceived as ‘cheating’ by outsiders, insiders seem not only to adapt but to rely on this outcome. They do not resent low quality exchanges, in fact, they seem to resent high-quality ones, and are inclined to ostracise and avoid dealing with agents who deliver high quality...

...Assume for simplicity that goods can be produced at two levels of quality, High (H) and Low (L)...

Problems arise if the two individuals agree on H but one of them delivers L. This is, of course, a risk of many exchanges: rational, unprincipled and self-interested agents prefer to dish out L rather than H, while at the same time, one would think, they also prefer to receive H rather than L. Dishonest second-hand car dealers prefer to sell a lemon while charging an H-price. This happens often enough...

...Usually, if one promises to deliver H and delivers L instead, one would think of this as a breach of trust. But in our case, it looks as if they rely on each other not to be entirely trustworthy, they trust their untrustworthiness. Not only do they live with each other’s laxness, but expect it: I trust you not to keep your promises in full because I want to be free not to keep mine and not to feel bad about it. There seems to be a double deal: an official pact in which both declare their intention to exchange H-goods, and a tacit accord whereby discounts are not only allowed but expected. It becomes a form of tacit mutual connivance on L-ness...

L-doers may want to keep up a credible façade with their surrounding H communities because they gain from this: Marseglia had an interest to pretend to comply with EU community standards because he was receiving EU olive oil subsidies. Also, L-doers manoeuvre to prop up their reputation for H-ness with their naïve local audiences by being seen standing shoulders to shoulders – briefly but as noisily as possible to be heard far and wide – with H-doers, as in the case of L-universities liberally dishing out honoris causa degrees.

...the maintenance of an H-façade may simply satisfy the need to reduce the cognitive dissonance between what one practices and what one preaches. The gap between the H-standards and the L-standards creates uneasiness among L-doers. Even if they cultivate specious legitimising reasons to practice L-ness (as we shall see below), many still seem aware that there is another set of reasons, which enjoin one to do H. The dissonance is reduced by interacting always with the same people, whom one can trust for not challenging one’s standards. L-doers segregate themselves in mutual admiration societies..."

The LL game: The curious preference for low quality and its norms in Politics Philosophy Economics 12(1), February 2013